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Abstract
Multiple price lists have emerged as a simple and popular method for eliciting risk pref-
erences. Despite their popularity, a key downside of multiple price lists has not been widely
recognized - namely that the approach is unlikely to generate sufficient information to accu-
rately identify different dimensions of risk preferences. The most popular theories of decision
making under risk posit that preference for risk are driven by a combination of two factors:
the curvature of the utility function and the extent to which probabilities are weighted non-
linearly. In this paper, we show that the widely used multiple price list introduced by Holt
and Laury (2002) is likely more accurate at eliciting the latter, and we introduce a different
multiple price list that is likely more accurate at eliciting the former. We show that by
combining information from different multiple price lists, greater predictive performance can
be achieved.
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1 Introduction
The abundance of uncertainty in life has prompted a great many investigations into
humans’ response to risk. The interest in understanding risk preferences has created a latent
demand for effective, easy-to-use risk preference elicitation devises. Following a long line of
previous research by Becker et al. (1964), Binswanger (1980, 1981), and many others, in 2002
Holt and Laury (H&L) introduced a risk preference elicitation method that has subsequently
become a mainstay. In a testament to the general interest in risk preference elicitation and to
the specific appeal of the approach introduced by H&L, their work has been cited more than
2,200 times according to Google Scholar and is the second most highly cited paper published
by the American Economic Review since 2002 according to ISIs Web of Knowledge. The
approach used by H&L has subsequently come to be referred to as a type of multiple price
list (MPL) (Andersen et al., 2006; Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008), an approach thought to
have been first used by Miller et al. (1969).1 The key advantage of the MPL is its ease of
use. Respondents make a series of consecutive choices between two outcomes, where the
expected value of one outcome increases at a higher rate than the other. The point at which
an individual switches from choosing one outcome over the other is often used as a measure
of risk aversion.
Despite the fact that MPLs are easy to use and easy for participants to understand,
the approach has some weaknesses. Harrison et al. (2005) pointed out that inferences from
MPLs can be influenced by order effects (see also Holt and Laury, 2005), and Andersen
et al. (2006) discussed the potential for choices in MPLs to be influenced by the ranges of
values used. Here, we point to a more fundamental problem with MPLs that seems to have
been overlooked by practitioners. In particular, the H&L approach is subject to Wakker and
Deneffe’s (1996) critique that many risk preference elicitation methods confound estimates
of the curvature of the utility function (i.e., the traditional notion of risk preference) with an
1The word “multiple” in multiple price list is redundant since the word “list” already implies repetitive
choices. Nevertheless, we adopt the phrasing MPL in this paper as it is more commonly used in the literature
than other variants such as “choice list.”
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estimate of the extent to which an individual weights probabilities non-linearly. These are two
conceptually different constructs that have different implications for individuals’ behavior
under risk, and without controlling for one, biased estimates of the other are obtained.
This observation about MPLs is well known to experts in the field of risk preference
elicitation, and yet in our experience, it is not well known to newcomers or those outside
the field. The purpose of this paper is to further elucidate some of these issues and more
widely disseminate this knowledge among the (apparently large) audience of individuals
interested in risk preference elicitation. Moreover, while we agree that the use of a single
“choice list” or MPL, may not perform well in fully capturing the multidimensional aspects
of risk preferences, it must be acknowledged that their popularity results from ease of use.
Accordingly, in this paper, we show that different types of MPLs are better able to capture
some risk dimensions than others and that by using two (or more) easy to use MPLs, a
researcher might achieve a more balanced picture of risk preferences, and thus might attain
improved predictive validity.2
In what follows, we show that H&L’s original MPL is, perhaps ironically, not particularly
well suited to measuring the traditional notion of risk preferences - the curvature of the
utility function. Rather, it is likely to provide a better approximation to the curvature of
the probability weighting function. We then introduce an alternative MPL that has exactly
the opposite property. By combining the information gained from both types of MPLs, we
show that greater prediction performance can be attained.
2 Effect of Probability Weighting in MPLs
In the base-line MPL used by H&L, individuals were asked to make a series of 10 decisions
between two options (see Table 1). In option A, the high payoff amount is fixed at $2 and
the low payoff amount is fixed at $1.60 across all 10 decision tasks. In option B, the high
2If interest rests solely in creating a single index of risk preference without committing to a single theory,
there are some relatively simple methods available such as the one shown in exercise 3.6.3 in Wakker (2010).
3
payoff amount is fixed at $3.85 and the low payoff amount is fixed at $0.10. The only thing
changing across the 10 decisions are the probabilities assigned to the high and low payoffs.
Initially the probability of receiving the high payoff is 0.10 but by the tenth decision task,
the probability is 1.0.
Table 1: The H&L Multiple Price List
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.1 2.00 0.9 1.60 0.1 3.85 0.9 0.10 1.640 0.475 1.17 −∞ -1.71
0.2 2.00 0.8 1.60 0.2 3.85 0.8 0.10 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95
0.3 2.00 0.7 1.60 0.3 3.85 0.7 0.10 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49
0.4 2.00 0.6 1.60 0.4 3.85 0.6 0.10 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15
0.5 2.00 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.85 0.5 0.10 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14
0.6 2.00 0.4 1.60 0.6 3.85 0.4 0.10 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41
0.7 2.00 0.3 1.60 0.7 3.85 0.3 0.10 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68
0.8 2.00 0.2 1.60 0.8 3.85 0.2 0.10 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97
0.9 2.00 0.1 1.60 0.9 3.85 0.1 0.10 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37
1 2.00 0 1.60 1 3.85 0 0.10 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
The expected value of lottery A exceeds the expected value of lottery B for the first four
decision tasks. Thus, someone who prefers lottery A for the first four decision tasks and
then switches and prefers lottery B for the remainder is often said to have near-risk neutral
preferences. Analysts often use the number of “safe choices” (the number of times option A
was chosen) or the A-B switching point to describe risk preferences and to infer the shape
of an assumed utility function (Bellemare and Shearer, 2010; Bruner et al., 2008; Eckel and
Wilson, 2004; Glockner and Hochman, 2011; Lusk and Coble, 2005).
Perhaps the first thing that should be noted about the original H&L MPL is that it
entails choices made over only four dollar amounts (0.10, 1.60, 2.00 and 3.85). Because a
utility function is unique only up to an affine transformation, one must fix two of these points
and can only identify the relative difference implied by the other two. Stated differently, the
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original H&L MPL reveals little information about the curvature of the utility function.3
By contrast, the H&L MPLs entails choices over 11 different probability amounts (from 0
to 1 in increments of 0.1). Thus, the approach contains much more information about the
potential shape of the probability weighting function over the entire probability domain.
To more formally address these issues, assume peoples preferences are represented by
rank-dependent utility theory introduced by Quiggin (1982) and incorporated into cumula-
tive prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Applying the theory to the H&L
MPL, the rank-dependent utility of option A is RDUA = w(p)U(2) + (1 − w(p))U(1.6)
and the rank-dependent utility of option B is RDUB = w(p)U(3.85) + (1 − w(p))U(0.1),
where p is the probability of receiving the higher payoff amount in each option. A person
chooses option A over B when RDUA > RDUB or when w(p)U(2) + (1 − w(p))U(1.6) >
w(p)U(3.85) + (1− w(p))U(0.1). Re-arranging, one can see that option A is chosen when:
w(p)
1− w(p) <
U(1.6)− U(0.1)
U(3.85)− U(2) (1)
Equation (1) reveals two important facts. First, the choice between option A and B in the
H&L task is driven both by the shape of w(p) and the shape of U(x) - i.e., it does not
separately identify only the curvature of the utility function or the coefficient of relative risk
aversion as is often presumed. Second, equation (1) shows that, at most, one can identify
only two utility differences U(1.6) − U(0.1) and U(3.85) − U(2), which is clearly a small
amount of information to be gleaned about the shape of U(x).
To illustrate the first point, note that many experimental studies have estimated the
shape of w(p) using functional forms such as w(p) = pγ/[pγ + (1 − p)γ]1/γ. Estimates of γ
typically fall in the range of 0.56 to 0.71 (e.g., see Camerer and Ho, 1994; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996), which implies an S-shaped probability weighting
3One can of course utilize several MPLs and scale up the payoffs as H&L did to allow for a wider range
of dollar amounts (thus providing more information on the shape of the utility function). However, those
researchers interested in adding a quick and simple risk preference elicitation devise to their studies are
unlikely to want to add numerous MPLs simply to get an informed shape of the utility function.
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function that over-weights low probability events and under-weights high probability events.
Now, consider a simple example where individuals have a linear utility function (i.e.,
they are risk neutral in the traditional sense), U(x) = x. With the traditional H&L task, a
risk neutral person with U(x) = x and γ = 1 would switch from option A to B at the fifth
decision task. However, if the person weights probabilities non-linearly, say with a value of
γ = 0.6, then they would instead switch from option A to B at the sixth decision task. Thus,
in the original H&L decision task, an individual with γ = 0.6, will appear to have a concave
utility function (if one ignores probability weighting) even though they have a linear utility
function, U(x) = x. The problem is further exasperated as γ diverges from one. Of course in
reality, people may weight probabilities non-linearly and exhibit diminishing marginal utility
of earnings, but the point remains: simply observing the A-B switching point in the H&L
decision task is insufficient to identify the shape of U(x) and the shape of w(p). The two
are confounded. While it is possible to use data from the H&L technique to estimate these
two constructs, U(x) and w(p), ex post, we argue that more information is contained about
w(p) than U(x) in the original H&L MPL.
In addition to the above arguments that choices in the H&L MPL are likely to provide
more information on the shape of w(p) than U(x) relates to the moderate level of payoffs
used in many experiments using MPLs. Several authors have argued that the utility function
should be linear over relatively low payoff amounts (Selten et al., 1999; Wakker, 2010). If
true, this would suggest that the risk averse behavior previously observed in H&L tasks
may well relate to w(p) than to U(x). A final piece of evidence suggesting that the original
H&L task is more likely to elicit probability weights than utility curvature are the findings
that in repeated choice tasks people are more likely to pay attention to the factors changing
across the tasks (which in the case of H&L are the probabilities). Because probabilities are
changing in the original H&L task, people are more likely to pay attention to this dimension
of choice (Bleichrodt, 2002).
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2.1 A New MPL
Given the preceding discussion, one might ask if there is a simple way to use a MPL that
yields more information about U(x) and, at least in some special cases, avoids the confound
between w(p) and U(x). One can indeed achieve such an outcome by following an approach
like the one used by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) in which probabilities are held constant.
Using this insight, we modify the H&L task such that probabilities remain constant across the
ten decision tasks and instead change the dollar payoffs down the ten tasks. Our approach is
similar to that used in prior research such as that by where certainty equivalents are elicited
from subjects by using repeated choices with varying payoff amounts (Cohen et al., 1987). 4
Table 2 shows a new MPL. In this MPL, the probabilities of all payouts are held constant
at 0.5. We constructed the new MPL shown in table 2 so that it matched the original H&L
MPL in terms of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) implied by a switch between
choosing option A and option B under the assumption of expected utility (EU) preferences.
For example, if an individual (with EU preferences) switched from choosing option A to
option B on the sixth row of the original H&L task, it would imply a CRRA between 0.14
and 0.41. Likewise, in the new MPL with constant probabilities, a switch from choosing
option A to option B on the sixth row would also imply (assuming EU preferences) a CRRA
between 0.14 and 0.41.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the new MPL compared to the H&L MPL?
At the onset, one can see that because the new MPL only utilizes one probability level, 0.5,
it cannot reveal much about the shape of the probability weighting function. However, the
new MPL entails choices over 22 different dollar payouts. Thus, the new MPL has the
4There a few other papers that have constructed tasks that vary the payoff amounts and hold probabilities
constant albeit their aim was different than this paper. For example Bruner (2009) asks whether equivalent
changes in the expected value of a lottery achieved by either changing the probability of a reward or by
changing the reward itself, will be preferred by risk averse agents as predicted by EUT (he finds that they
do). More recently, Bosch-Dome`nech and Silvestre (2013) compare a standard H&L task with a task they
adopt from Abdellaoui et al. (2011) (which in turn is similar to the certainty equivalents method of Cohen
et al. (1987)) for embedding bias. They find that the H&L task is susceptible to embedding bias while the
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) task is not.
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Table 2: New MPL with Constant Probabilities
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.5 1.68 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.01 0.5 1.00 1.640 1.506 0.13 −∞ -1.71
0.5 1.76 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.17 0.5 1.00 1.680 1.583 0.10 -1.71 -0.95
0.5 1.84 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.32 0.5 1.00 1.720 1.658 0.06 -0.95 -0.49
0.5 1.92 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.48 0.5 1.00 1.760 1.738 0.02 -0.49 -0.15
0.5 2.00 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.65 0.5 1.00 1.800 1.827 -0.03 -0.15 0.14
0.5 2.08 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.86 0.5 1.00 1.840 1.932 -0.09 0.14 0.41
0.5 2.16 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.14 0.5 1.00 1.880 2.068 -0.19 0.41 0.68
0.5 2.24 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.54 0.5 1.00 1.920 2.272 -0.35 0.68 0.97
0.5 2.32 0.5 1.60 0.5 4.50 0.5 1.00 1.960 2.748 -0.79 0.97 1.37
0.5 2.40 0.5 1.60 0.5 4.70 0.5 1.00 2.000 2.852 -0.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
potential to yield much more information about the shape of the utility function than does
the traditional H&L MPL.
To consider these ideas more formally, again assume individuals have rank-dependent
preferences and note that option A will be chosen over option B if w(0.5)U(AH) + (1 −
w(0.5))U(1.6) > w(0.5)U(BH) + (1−w(0.5))U(1), where AH and BH are the higher payoffs
for options A and B, respectively (values which changes over the 10 decision tasks), and
where AH > 1.6, BH > 1, and BH > AH . Re-arranging terms, one can see that option A is
chosen if:
w(0.5)
1− w(0.5) <
U(1.6)− U(1)
U(BH)− U(AH) (2)
Comparing equation (2) with equation (1), one can see that the original H&L task can utilize
10 points to estimate the function for w(p) but by contrast, the new task can only estimate a
single point, w(0.5). In contrast, whereas the original H&L task can only estimate two utility
differences, the new task can estimate 11. Thus, the new MPL reveals more information
about the shape of U(x) than the original H&L MPL, but the original H&L MPL reveals
more information about the shape of w(p) than does the new task.
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2.1.1 The New MPL under Original Prospect Theory Preferences
There is one additional feature of the new MPL shown in table 2 that bears mention.
Although it does not totally do away with the aforementioned confound between w(p) and
U(x) assuming rank-dependent preferences, the confound completely disappears if people
weight probabilities as in original prospect theory.
If people weight probabilities according to original prospect theory, in the new MPL they
will choose option A when w(0.5)U(AH) +w(0.5)U(1.6) > w(0.5)U(BH) +w(0.5)U(1). One
can divide both sides of this inequality by w(0.5) to see that option A will be chosen when
U(AH) + U(1.6) > U(BH) + U(1), or rewriting:
1 <
U(1.6)− U(1)
U(BH)− U(AH) (3)
Because equation (3) does not contain the term w(0.5), the choice of option A over B cannot
be explained by probability weighting. Stated differently, even if an individual weights
probabilities non-linearly in the fashion given by original prospect theory, only the shape of
U(x) will dictate their choices in the new MPL show in table 2.
The condition in (3) could only be obtained because of our choice of the probability
value 0.5. For any other probability value the weighting function does not drop out and
the confound remains.5 Thus, in the original H&L task (which uses probabilities from 0 to
1), the confound between w(p) and U(x) remains even if preferences are given by original
prospect theory.
3 Experiment
To investigate some of the issues discussed above, a laboratory experiment was conducted
to compare behavior in the original H&L MPL and our new MPL. Moreover, the experiment
5Most empirical estimates suggest that w(0.3) ≈ 0.3. It is possible to also use this empirical relation to
create a MPL that avoids probability weighting.
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was designed to see which MPL (or whether a combination of the two) could better predict
a hold-out sample of choices. The next sub-section describes the subjects, recruiting, and
experimental environment. Then, we describe the different treatments used in the study.
3.1 Description of the experiment set-up
A lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects
consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Ioannina, Greece and were recruited
using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). During the recruitment, subjects were
told that they would be given the chance to make more money during the experiment.6
Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate samples that are less risk averse than
would otherwise have been observed (Harrison et al., 2009).
Subjects participated in sessions of group sizes that varied from 9 to 11 subjects per ses-
sion (all but two sessions involved groups of 10 subjects). In total, 100 subjects participated
in 10 sessions that were conducted between December 2011 and January 2012. Each session
lasted about 45 minutes and subjects were paid a 10eparticipation fee. Subjects were given
a power point presentation explaining the risk preferences tasks as well as printed copies of
instructions. They were also initially given a five-choice training task to familiarize them
with the choice screens that would appear in the real task. Subjects were told that choices
in the training phase would not count toward their earnings and that this phase was purely
hypothetical.
Full anonymity was ensured by asking subjects to choose a unique three-digit code from a
jar. The code was then entered at an input stage once the computerized experiment started.
The experimenter only knew correspondence between digit codes and profits. Profits and
participation fees were put in sealed envelopes (the digit code was written on the outside) and
were exchanged with printed digit codes at the end of the experiment. No names were asked
at any point of the experiment. Subjects were told that their decisions were independent
6Subjects were told that “In addition to a fixed fee of 10, you will have a chance of receiving additional
money up to 25. This will depend on the decisions you make during the experiment.”
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from other subjects, and that they could finish the experiment at their own convenience.
Average total payouts including lottery earnings were 15.2e (S.D.=4.56).
3.2 Risk preference elicitation
Our experiment entailed a 2x2 within-subject design, where each subject completed two
different multiple price lists (MPL) at two payout (low vs. high) amounts. As shown in
Table 3, the baseline (or control) involved the original H&L task at their low payoff amounts
(a task we refer to as H&L1).
Table 3: Treatments in experiment
Payout
Multiple Price List low(x1) high (x5)
H&L H&L1 H&L5
New MPL with constant probabilities nMPL1 nMPL5
Hold-out task H1 H5
The baseline H&L MPL presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries, A or B.
For each lottery choice show in Table 1, a subject chose A, B or could state indifference
between A and B. The last choice shown in Table 1 is a simple test of whether subjects
understood the instructions correctly.7 The second treatment (H&L5) is identical to the
first (H&L1) except that all payouts are scaled up by a magnitude of five.
In addition to the choices in treatments H&L1 and H&L5, subjects also completed the
new MPL show in Table 2 (nMPL1) and another set of choices identical to the ones shown
in Table 2 except that all payoffs were scaled up by a magnitude of five (nMPL5).
Instead of providing a table of choices arrayed in an ordered manner all appearing on
the same page as in H&L, each choice was presented separately showing probabilities and
prizes (as in Andersen et al., 2011). Subjects could move back and forth between screens in
a given table but not between tables. Once all ten choices in a table were made, the table
716 out of 100 subjects failed to pass this test concerning comprehension of lotteries and were omitted
from our sample.
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was effectively inaccessible. The order of appearance of the treatments for each subject was
completely randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison et al., 2005). An example of one of
the decision tasks is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Example Decision Task
One of the implicit arguments made thus far is that the original H&L task can better
estimate the probability weighting function and the new MPL can better estimate the utility
function. As such, a combination of the insights attained by the two approaches might result
in a better overall model. To determine whether this combination is indeed “better” than
either used alone, we used out-of-sample prediction as our measure of performance. Thus,
as shown in Table 3, the study also included two hold-out tasks which we use as the basis
of measuring prediction performance. We constructed these hold-out tasks by creating yet
another MPL that modified the original H&L design such that the probability of receiving
the higher payout option increased nonlinearly down the list (see Table 4). The MPL is
constructed so that it matched the original H&L task in terms of the coefficient of relative
risk aversion (CRRA) implied by a switch between choosing option A and option B under the
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assumption that subjects have prospect-theory preferences where they weigh probabilities
nonlinearly with w(p) = p0.6/[p0.6 + (1− p)0.6]1/0.6.
Table 4: Holdout Task
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.03 2.00 0.97 1.60 0.03 3.85 0.97 0.10 1.610 0.194 1.42 −∞ -1.71
0.09 2.00 0.91 1.60 0.09 3.85 0.91 0.10 1.636 0.439 1.20 -1.71 -0.95
0.20 2.00 0.80 1.60 0.20 3.85 0.80 0.10 1.678 0.835 0.84 -0.95 -0.49
0.34 2.00 0.66 1.60 0.34 3.85 0.66 0.10 1.735 1.365 0.37 -0.49 -0.15
0.50 2.00 0.50 1.60 0.50 3.85 0.50 0.10 1.800 1.975 -0.17 -0.15 0.14
0.66 2.00 0.34 1.60 0.66 3.85 0.34 0.10 1.865 2.585 -0.72 0.14 0.41
0.80 2.00 0.20 1.60 0.80 3.85 0.20 0.10 1.922 3.116 -1.19 0.41 0.68
0.91 2.00 0.09 1.60 0.91 3.85 0.09 0.10 1.964 3.512 -1.55 0.68 0.97
0.97 2.00 0.03 1.60 0.97 3.85 0.03 0.10 1.990 3.756 -1.77 0.97 1.37
1 2.00 0 1.60 1 3.85 0 0.10 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
Because each subject completed three MPLs (with 10 choices each) at two payouts, they
each made 60 binary choices. For each subject, one of the 60 choices was randomly chosen
and paid out. 8
8One line of criticism with the Random Lottery Incentive Mechanism (RLIM) as first put forward by Holt
(1986), is that if the Independence Axiom imbedded in EUT is not satisfied, then the experiment might fail
to elicit true preferences. Although subsequently the criticism was shown by Starmer and Sugden (1991),
Cubitt et al. (2004) and Hey and Lee (2005b) to have no empirical merit, the issue has been re-opened
recently by one group of researchers (Cox et al., 2011; Harrison and Swarthout, 2012). In the context of
our experiment, it seems implausible to assume a priori that subjects are sophisticated enough to consider
the whole experiment as being one single question. On the contrary, we can reasonably assume that such
overall optimization could easily exceed subjects’ information processing capacities given that each subject
had to respond to 60 choice tasks. A more plausible pattern of choices would be cross-task contamination
in the form of serially-correlated responses that are inconsistent with isolation. To tackle this issue we used
the procedures set forth in Hey and Lee (2005a) to examine for cross-task contamination and found that
for 19 subjects we can clearly reject the isolation hypothesis. When we exclude those 19 subjects from the
estimations, our results hold both qualitatively and quantitatively. Thus, although we recognize the potential
theoretical problems of the RLIM as an incentive compatible mechanism with non-EUT alternatives, it makes
little difference with our data.
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4 Data analysis and results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of subjects choosing option A for the original H&L task
and the new task for small and large payoff amounts. Note that all four tasks were designed
to elicit the same switching point for a given risk aversion coefficient under the assumption
of expected utility preferences (an assumption we will show later to be descriptively invalid).
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
%
 c
ho
os
in
g 
op
tio
n 
A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decision
H&L1 H&L5
nMPL1 nMPL5
risk neutral (EUT)
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents choosing option A for each decision task
The two H&L tasks and the nMPL5 tasks, imply significant risk averse behavior as
subjects switch, on average, far after task four. However, for the low-payoff new task,
nMPL1, where probabilities are held constant, a different picture emerges. Subjects appear
less risk averse in the constant-probability task than in the conventional H&L task.
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One striking difference in nMPL1 task is the fact that the percent choosing option A
remains at about 50% for the first five decision task, and, in fact, slightly increases over
this range. One explanation for this trend is that the new task generated more multiple
switching points than the standard H&L task.9 If we calculate the number of choices that
violate monotonicity, we find that the average subject made 0.21 and 0.11 such violations in
the original H&L task at low and high payouts, respectively. By contrast, in our new MPL
tasks with constant probabilities, the average subject made 0.85 and 0.69 such violations in
the low and high payout tasks, respectively. Over the first few choices in the new decision
task at low payoffs (nMPL1), the difference in the expected values between lottery options
A and B were relatively small, and this might partially explain why the task generated more
switching behavior. However, it should be noted that such small differences in expected
values were required to generate the same implied CRRA intervals as the original H&L task
given the overall payout magnitudes. Thus, this is not a feature of the new task per se
but rather a feature of constant relative risk aversion and expected utility theory applied
to lotteries with payouts of the magnitude considered in the original H&L task but with
constant probabilities. Importantly, we have analyzed our data removing individuals that
significantly violated monotonicity (i.e., made three or more inconsistent choices), and our
econometric estimates (discussed momentarily) are virtually unchanged.
Figure 2 also illustrates the effects of scaling off payoffs. For the traditional H&L task,
increasing payoffs had very little effect on the percentage of times option A was chosen.
However, increasing payoffs had a much larger effect on our new MPL. The issue of mono-
tonicity does not appear as problematic in the new MPL when payoffs are scaled up by a
factor of five. This might be because the expected value differences between options A and
B (shown in table 2) are also scaled up by a factor of five in this task.
9In our experiment, we did not impose monotonicity on choices or provide warnings when monotonicity
was violated. Although such a procedure could be implemented, it is unclear if it is superior to simply
observing how people behave when unconstrained.
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4.2 Econometric modeling approach
To explore the results in terms of the curvature of the utility and probability weighting
functions, we utilize the random utility approach also used by Andersen et al. (2008) and
use the rank-dependent utility model as the base-line model of analysis. Letting the random
rank-dependent utility of option A experienced by individual i in choice j be:
V Aij = Z
A
ij + ε
A
ij (4)
and similarly for option B:
V Bij = Z
B
ij + ε
B
ij (5)
where εij is a stochastic error term assumed to be known to the individual but unobservable
to the analyst, and where ZAij and Z
B
ij are the systematic portions of the utility functions
assumed to follow rank-dependent preferences, i.e., ZAij = w(pj)U(A
H
j ) + (1− w(pj))U(ALj ),
where AHj is the high payoff and A
L
j is the low payoff for option A in choice j.
The probability of option A being chosen over option B is the probability that V Aij > V
B
ij .
Assuming the difference in the error terms is distributed i.i.d. normal with standard deviation
equal to σ, the probability A is chosen is:
PAij = Φ((Z
A
ij − ZBij )/σ) (6)
Thus, a log likelihood function can be defined for estimation:
LLF =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
[yijln(P
A
ij ) + (1− yij)ln(1− PAij )] (7)
where yij = 1 if option A is chosen and yij = 0 if option B is chosen. If an individual
indicates indifference to A and B, yij = 0.5.
In the analyses that follow, we consider several specifications for w(p) and U(x). The
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base-line specifications for the utility function is the constant relative risk aversion specifica-
tion: U(x) = x
1−r
1−r , where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
10 In the new MPLs we
have many more points on the utility function and can also estimate an expo-power utility
function (Saha, 1993): U(x) = (1− exp(−αx1−r))/α.
For the probability weighting function in the H&L MPLs, we consider the function used
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and others: w(p) = pγ/[pγ+(1−p)γ]1/γ. We also estimated
the probability weighting function proposed by Prelec (1998): w(p) = exp(−β(−ln(p)τ )).
For the new MPL, there is only a single probability point and thus we need only estimate a
single parameter, θ, representing the weight placed on the 0.5 probability, i.e., w(0.5) = θ.
We estimated each of these competing specifications separately for high and low payoffs
(note: likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis of equality of parameters across high and
low payoffs for each specification). Moreover, we used the AIC and BIC model selection
criteria to determine the best fitting model for each dataset.
4.3 Econometric Results
For the traditional H&L MPLs, each of the aforementioned model variations was esti-
mated (see the appendix Table A.1). For both high and low payoffs, the AIC and BIC model
selection criteria indicate a preference for the rank-dependent models over the prospect-
theory models. Within the rank-dependent models, the Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
probability weighting function is preferred to the Prelec (1998) weighting function according
to the AIC and BIC.
The preferred model for both the H&L1 and H&L5 treatments is the CRRA model with
the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function. For low-payoffs, the
estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r = 0.004) was not statistically different
10In the original H&L task, we can also estimate a “non-parametric” utility function and instead estimate
the two utility differences shown in equation (1): [U(1.6) − U(0.1)] and [U(3.85) − U(2)]. In this latter
case, however, the standard deviation, σ, is no longer separately identified and must be normalized to one.
In the H&L MPL, this formulation is actually observationally equivalent to the CRRA specification with σ
freely estimated; both utility specifications give identical maximum likelihood function values and probability
weighting estimates. These results are shown in the appendix Table A.1.
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from zero, but the estimated parameter on the probability weighting function, γ = 0.501,
was statistically different from one, indicating a rejection of the expected utility model in
favor of the rank-dependent model. Similarly, for high-payoffs, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (r = −0.135) was not statistically different from zero, but the estimated parameter
on the probability weighting function,γ = 0.45, was statistically different from one. Thus, at
least for our subjects, the apparent risk averse behavior shown in Figure 2 is solely a result of
probability weighting rather than utility function curvature for the conventional H&L tasks.
The implication is that practitioners using the H&L task to infer curvature of the utility
function would have arrived at erroneous conclusions had they not also jointly estimated the
extent to which people weight probabilities non-linearly.
Figure 3 plots the estimated probability weighting functions for the low-payoff H&L1
MPL. In addition to the two aforementioned functional forms, we also show the results
of a “non-parametric” estimation in which a single parameter is estimated for each of the
11 probability points available in the H&L task (with the lowest normalized to zero and
the highest normalized to one). Although the “non parametric” form is not preferred to the
parametric forms according to AIC and BIC, the results reveal the level of information about
probability weights obtainable from the H&L task. In all specifications, the results reveal
significant over-weighting of low probability events and under-weighting of high probability
events.
Turning to the new MPLs, the AIC and BIC indicate that the most preferred models (see
full results in appendix Table A.2) are the models assuming constant relative risk aversion
with the error variance normalized to one for both the low and high payoff tasks. The
results reveal that at low payoffs, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r = 0.116) was
not statistically different from zero and the estimated weight applied to probability 0.50 was
w(0.5) = 0.581, a difference (0.581 − 0.50 = 0.081) which is not statistically different from
zero, implying linear probability weighting in the vicinity of p = 0.5. Taken together, for
low payoffs, the estimates imply near risk-neutral behavior for the new MPL.
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Figure 3: Non-linear probability weighting implied by three different models for the H&L1
MPL
At high payoffs, however, a different picture emerges. For our new MPL which utilizes
much more variation over payoff amounts than the H&L task, we find that for high payoffs,
a statistically significant estimate for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r = 0.233)
emerges. Moreover, we find that the estimated weight applied to probability 0.50 was
w(0.5) = 0.366. This estimate of probability weighing is very similar to that implied by
the high-payoff H&L task (with γ = 0.45, the H&L5 task implies w(0.5) = 0.313).
4.4 Prediction performance
Because of the larger variation in probabilities in the H&L task, we have argued that this
task should yield better estimates of the curvature of the probability weighting function. By
contrast, because of the larger variation in the dollar amounts in our new MPL, we have
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argued that this task should yield better estimates of the curvature of the utility function.
To put these conjectures to the test, we now see how well the aforementioned estimates are
able to predict the holdout tasks at low (H1) and high (H2) payoff amounts.
In particular, we compare the predictive performance of three models: i) a model based
on the estimate of r and γ from the H&L MPL, ii) a model based on the estimate of r (and
for lack of a better choice assuming γ = 1) from the nMPL, and finally iii) a composite model
in which we use the estimate of r from our new MPL and the estimate of γ from the H&L
MPL.11 To judge predictive fit, we use two criteria: 1) the percent of correct predictions
and 2) the value of the likelihood function observed at out-of-sample values — the out-of-
sample log-likelihood function (OSLLF). The out-of-sample log-likelihood function approach
has long been used in the marketing literature for model selection (Erdem, 1996; Roy et al.,
1996) and further elucidated in the economics literature by Norwood, Roberts, and Lusk
(2004) and ?. The OSLLF has desirable properties in judging the predictive fit of discrete
choice models and it is our preferred selection criteria.
Table 5 shows the performance of the three models in predicting the out-of-sample hold-
out choices. For low payoffs, the composite model generates the same % correct predictions
but has a lower OSLLF than the H&L MPL. Although a paired-test indicates no significant
difference in the composite-model and H&L1 OSLLF values, the non-parametric sign-rank
test indicates the two are significantly different (p-value < 0.01). The composite model
outperforms the nMPL both in terms of percent of correct predictions and in terms of
OSLLF (both the t-test and signed-rank test indicate OSLLFs are significantly different at
p < 0.01 level).
A similar result is obtained for the high-payoff values. Although all three models generate
11Our composite model takes the estimate of the curvature of the probability weighting from the H&L
task and the estimate of the curvature of the utility function from the new MPL. An alternative approach is
to pool the two data sets and estimate a combined model. When we do this for the low payoff task, we find
an estimate of r = 0.3249 and γ = 0.6904, and σ = 0.5883, all of which are significantly different from zero.
However, this model exhibits significantly poorer out of sample predictions with the OSLLF= −0.5222 and
% correct predictions=76.42% than the composite model discussed in the main text. A similar result holds
for the high payoff task.
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Table 5: Out-of-sample prediction performance of three competing models
H&L predictions nMPL predictions Composite model predictions
low payoffs
OSLLF -0.4068 -0.4677 -0.4025
% correct 83.57% 76.43% 83.57%
high payoffs
OSLLF -0.4696 -1.0565 -0.3876
% correct 83.09% 83.09% 82.60%
similar performance in terms of the percentage of correct predictions, the composite model
far outperforms the H&L5 and nMPL5 tasks in isolation according to the OSLLF values
(the composite model yields significantly different OSLLF values as compared to the H&L5
and nMPL5 tasks according to t-tests and signed-rank tests at the p < 0.01 level).
Taken together, the results in Table 5 largely confirm our intuition that better predictions
can be made by using the H&L task to infer the curvature of the probability weighting
function and the new MPL to infer the curvature of the utility function.
5 Conclusion
Although H&L introduced a useful tool for characterizing risk taking behavior, their
approach is limited in being able to identify why a particular behavior under risk was ob-
served. Risk averse behavior could result from curvature of the utility function, curvature of
the probability weighting function, or both. The obvious implication is that caution should
be taken in directly using a single number like “number of safe choices” from H&Ls risk pref-
erence elicitation method to infer curvature of the utility function, the theoretical concept
that is often of interest, because risk averse behavior may be driven by probability weighting.
In fact, we show that, if anything, the H&L task is probably best suited to measuring the
curvature of the probability weighting function.
We introduced a modified version of the H&L task which held probabilities constant at
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0.50 and provided much more variation in the payoff amounts. By providing more varia-
tion in payoff amounts, we hoped to obtain better estimates of the curvature of the utility
function. By and large, that’s what our experimental results imply. At both low and high
payoff amounts, econometric estimates suggest that behavior is almost totally driven by the
curvature of the probability weighting function (the estimated CRRA is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero in either case). Only with our new MPL under high payoffs did we observe
significant curvature in the utility function.
To test our intuition about the relative merits of the two elicitation approaches, we sought
to determine whether a composite model that combined the estimate of the curvature of the
utility function from our new MPL with the estimate of the curvature of the probability
weighting function from the H&L task would exhibit better out-of-sample prediction perfor-
mance with a hold-out task than either model used in isolation. Our results implied that
the composite model did indeed generate lower OSLLF values than the estimates from the
conventional H&L task or the MPL used alone.
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Table A.2: Competing estimates for the nMPL1 and nMPL5 tasks
CRRA normalized CRRA expo power
low payoff
r -0.610 (1.518) 0.116 (0.180) 0.368 (1.341)
θ — — -0.340 (2.275)
w(0.5) 0.517** (0.153) 0.581** (0.072) 0.581** (0.074)
σ 2.376 (4.339) 1 1
LLF -539.6 -539.7 -539.65
AIC 1085.2 1083.4 1085.3
BIC 1099.4 1092.9 1099.5
high payoff
r 1.022 (0.949) 0.233** (0.030) -0.083 (0.171)
θ — — 0.048** (0.009)
w(0.5) 0.526** (0.192) 0.366** (0.011) 0.434** (0.062)
σ 0.134 (0.337) 1 1
LLF -477.1 -477.45 -476.9
AIC 960.2 958.9 959.8
BIC 974.4 968.4 974
Note: **(*) Statistically significant at the 5%(10%) level.
Numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors.
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